Abstract-Most cryptosystems are defined over finite algebraic structures where arithmetic operations are performed modulo natural numbers. This applies to private key as well as to public key ciphers. No secure cryptosystems defined over the field of real numbers are known. In this work, we demonstrate the feasibility of constructing secure symmetric key ciphers defined over the field of real numbers. We consider the security of ciphers introduced in a previous work and based on solving linear and non-linear equations numerically. We complement the design of those ciphers to satisfy the requirements of secure systems and, consequently, extend them into composite ciphers with multiple encryptions. We show security enhancements by estimating the uncertainty in finding the keys using a measure based on Shannon's entropy function.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography literature indicates that all known cryptosystems are defined over algebraic structures with finite sets. The order of these sets must be sufficiently large so as to make an exhaustive search (or brute-force attack) in the key space impractical. Both private key (symmetric) and public key (asymmetric) cryptosystems share this feature. In addition, symmetric key cipher design must follow information theoretic principles to hide the internal structure of the encryption scheme, and, for public key ciphers, one-way trapdoor functions defined over finite structures are required; see for example, [7] , [11] , [15] and [16] , to name a few.
No cryptosystems defined over real numbers and implemented using floating point representations are known to be secure. Bergamo et al. [1] refer to examples of insecure symmetric key cryptosysyems based on chaotic maps. The authors also show that the public key cryptosystems of Kocarev and Tasev [6] based on chaos theory and use Chebyshev polynomials defined over real numbers are insecure. Due to the finite precision of the floating point representations of real numbers, rounding errors are unavoidable. For this reason, Kocarev and Tasev suggest upper bounds on numeric inputs to ensure the validity of the semi-group property of Chebychev polynomials, required to establish the public key protocol. On the other hand, finding a one-way trapdoor function over the field of real numbers similar to the function defined over the multiplicative group of a finite field, f (x) = g x (mod p), and known as the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), seems to be difficult.
In symmetric key cryptography finding a one-way trapdoor function is not required and in case the design of encryption schemes allows rounding errors without loss of protocol correctness, it is possible to construct secure symmetric key cryptosystems over real numbers. The purpose of the current work is to demonstrate the construction of secure symmetric ciphers defined over the field of real numbers. Cryptosystems based on real numeric root-finding methods have been introduced by the author in [3] . We address the security of these cryptosystems and extend them into multiple encryption product ciphers to meet the requirements of secure communications suggested by Shannon in his seminal work on communication theory of secrecy systems [14] . To this end, we consider a security measure based on the entropy function proposed by Shannon in his earlier work on the theory of communication [13] , and use this measure to estimate the security gained due to the addition of extra encryptions.
The contribution of this work can be summarized as follows:
• it extends the conference paper in : i) describing the proposed encryption schemes in more details ii) extending the encryption schemes into multiple encryption systems (product ciphers) iii) addressing the security of the product ciphers against ciphertext only attack and against known plaintext attack iv) estimating the gained security by defining a security measure based on Shannon's entropy function
• it demonstrates the feasibility of constructing secure symmetric key ciphers over the field of real numbers • it conjectures that a symmetric key cipher based on solving a system of linear equations and defined over the field of real numbers is secure against ciphertext only attack • it shows that security of symmetric key ciphers defined over the real field depends solely on the size of key space, that is, on the precision and range of floating point representations of real numbers • it indicates that with appropriate software libraries, arbitrary precision is possible and, therefore, the key space size can be made arbitrarily large, thus allowing secure symmetric key ciphers over the field of real numbers
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This work is organized as follows: the next section (II) introduces the two private key ciphers based on numerical methods. Section (III) addresses the security features of the proposed encryption schemes. In Section (IV), the encryption schemes are extended to cascading cryptosystems involving multiple substitution and transposition operations. Section (V) estimates the security gain due to the addition of extra encryptions, and, finally, Section (VI) concludes the paper with a summary and future research directions.
II. CRYPTOSYSTEMS DEFINED OVER R
In this section, two encryption schemes defined over R and based on employing numerical methods are described [3] . The first is a substitution n-block cipher (n > 1) based on solving a system of n linear equations. The second is a onecharacter block cipher and is based on solving single nonlinear equations numerically.
A. Cipher based on solving a set of linear equations
The key consists of n-vector (b i ) and an n × n matrix (a ij ). Here, n represents the block-length. Encrypting a block of n characters, represented by vector (c i ), is achieved by solving the following system of linear equations:
Provided that (a ij ) is invertible, solution vectors (x * i ) exist; each represents a block of n ciphertext entries. The condition on (a ij ) guarantees that the encryption function is bijective and, consequently, has an inverse-the decryption function. Decrypting the ciphered text is achieved by subsequently substituting solution vectors into Equation (1) giving rise to c i = b i − n j=1 a ij x * j . One may re-write Equation 1 in an equivalent form:
where (x kj ) represents the ciphertext; it is an (n × m) matrix with m columns representing blocks, each of which is of size n. The (n × m) matrix (c ij ) represents the plaintext of (nm) characters; matrix c ij makes dividing the plaintext into blocks, each of size n, explicit.
The following example serves to explain the encryption scheme by comparing it to a similar classical substitution cipher, namely, the Hill-cipher [4] . Consider a 2 × 2 matrix key and a constant vector defined as follows:
Let "epic" be part of a plaintext. The ascii code of this part can be written in matrix form as (c ij ) = 101 105 112 99 .
The solution of the linear Equations (2) can then be written as 
B. Cipher based on solving non-linear equations
The key is a non-linear function with one variable f (x). The encryption function is defined as finding a solution of the equation:
Here, (c i ) represents the numerical code of the i th character in the plaintext, e.g., the ascii-code. To guarantee that the encryption function has an inverse, numerical encoding of plaintext together with f (x) must be chosen in such a way that equation (3) has at least one real root. The roots {x * i } represent the ciphertext. On the recipient side, each entry (x * i ) is decrypted by substituting it into f (x), giving rise to the plaintext character c i = f (x * i ). We remark that f (x * i ) must be appropriately rounded to recover c i .
For example, given f (x) = 2 (x 2 −x) as key, encrypting "epic" amounts to solving, one at a time, four non-linear equations numerically:
where c i takes the values: 101, 112, 105 and 99. As a result, we get the following ciphertext using the Secant method: 
III. SECURITY OF THE CRYPTOSYSTEMS
In this section, security features of the encryption schemes introduced in the previous section are considered. Kerchoff's Principle is assumed, that is, the specification of the encryption algorithm is known but the key is unknown.
There are two ways to break a private key cipher. One way is to try all possible alternatives; the so-called exhaustive search or brute-force attack. This technique is guaranteed to succeed, but it is impractical if the key space is sufficiently large The second class of techniques is based on making use of the internal structure of the cipher; for example, as to how plaintext character blocks are mapped or encrypted into ciphertext symbols. Such information helps the adversary choose the most effective attack method.
Contemporary symmetric key ciphers, invented post 1970s, follow Shannon's two design principles of secure encryption [14] : confusion and diffusion. Contemporary ciphers are composite cryptosystems in which substitution is combined with transposition several times; substitution adds confusion to the encryption process and transposition adds diffusion. Examples of design strategies underlying remarkable contemporary symmetric cipherse may explain how Shannon's design requirements are satisfied:
1) Apply Feistel function (16 times) consisting of various operations, including expansion, key addition, S-Box substitution, P-Box permutation, and XOR, e.g., DES of the National Institute of Standards (US) [9] 2) Employ three operations: modular addition, bit rotation and XOR, e.g., RC5, suggested by R. L. Rivest [12] 3) Mix two operations: a substitution and a permutation over finite fields, e.g., AES of the National Institute of Standards (US) [8] With the design principles of Shannon's information theory, plaintext letters frequency distributions are diffused and, therefore, attacks based on statistical analysis of ciphertexts, given the statistical properties of the underlying language, fail. Diffusion breaks monoalphabetic 1-to-1 correspondence between plaintext and ciphertext. Next, we consider different attack models on the proposed encryption schemes and discuss their robustness.
A. Ciphertext only attack
In this attack model, the adversary possesses only a copy of the ciphertext. Our cipher design based on solving a system of linear equations, Equation (2), does not preserve plaintext letters frequency distributions, it is a polyalphabetic cryptosystem as the Hill cipher, and, therefore, statistical analysis using plaintext language redundancies is meaningless. According to Stinson [16] , the Hill cipher is known to be hard to break in the ciphertext only attack model. The complexity of breaking the cipher can be evaluated by calculating the size of the key space. The size of the key space of Hill cipher with (n×n) key matrix defined over finite ring Z m has been found by Overbey et al. [10] :
The number of (n × n) matrices invertible mod
Where GL(n, Z m ) represents the group of (n × n) matrices invertible over Z m . With m = 2 × 13, the size of the key space will be:
An exhaustive search requires 26 n 2 matrix multiplications. Our cipher possesses a key space of a size bounded by the precision of the floating point representation of real numbers. For example, the IEEE 754-1985 standard for binary floating point arithmetic [5] , implemented by most compilers, and in particular the GCC compiler, defines an effective doubleprecision floating point range of ±(2 − 2 −52 ) × 2 1023 with 52 bits of accuracy. This amounts to a range of ≈ 308 decimal digits with ≈ 16 decimal digits of accuracy. We remark that arbitrary precision can be achieved using appropriate libraries, e.g., the MPFR library. Therefore, an exhaustive search can be made practically impossible.
We conjecture that the cipher based on solving the system, Equation (2), defined over real numbers with double-precision floating point representation is secure in the ciphertext attack model.
The cipher based on solving non-linear equations numerically, Equation (3), is monoalphabetic and, therefore, is vulnerable against attacks based on statistical analysis using plaintext letters frequency distributions.
B. Known plaintext attack
In this attack model the adversary possesses a copy of (or a part) of the plaintext as well as a copy of the corresponding ciphertext. In the following, we denote plaintext characters by {c i } and their corresponding ciphertext symbols by {x * i }. Here, every c i corresponds to an ascii-code and every x * i to a real number and i ranges over the size l of (a part of) the plaintext.
The encryption scheme based on solving a system of linear equations (2) is completely linear and, therefore, vulnerable against known plaintext attacks. If the dimension (n) of the key matrix (a ij ) is known, a data set consisting of an (n + 1)
2 (c i , x * i ) pairs is sufficient to establish a system of linear equations whose solution is the key matrix elements (a ij ) and (b i ).
As indicated, the encryption scheme based on solving non-linear equation (3) is monoalphabetic; there is a 1-to-1 correspondence from a subset of ascii-codes to a subset of R implying that the ( Given a data set, a unique polynomial p(x) can be constructed using interpolation. The construction procedure depends on the basis polynomials of the vector space of dimension equals degree of p(x) + 1.
IV. APPLYING SHANNON'S DESIGN PRINCIPLES
As mentioned in Section III, contemporary symmetric ciphers are composite systems which combine a multiple of substitution and transposition operations in the encryption process to achieve reasonable security levels. In the same section, we indicated that the proposed ciphers are restricted to substitution, and therefore, do not conform to Shannon's principles of secure encryption.
To improve security, we may extend the proposed encryption schemes into multiple encryption systems (product ciphers) by concatenating them to an arbitrary number of other block ciphers with independent keys. The following examples are restricted to extending the proposed schemes up to a maximum of three stages; they should serve as a proof of concept, that is, to demonstrate the feasibility of constructing secure symmetric ciphers defined over the field of real numbers.
A. Product cipher with solving linear equations A 2-stage product cipher combining the proposed substitution cipher based on solving systems of linear equations (2) with an independent transposition cipher would add the required diffusion to the encryption process. This would enhance the security against known plaintext attacks referred to in the previous paragraph. Symbolically, the product cipher encryption function can be expressed as follows:
The reverse operation (decryption) follows a reverse order and can be symbolically expressed as:
Here, e ktr and e k lin represent, respectively, transposition encryption function and the encryption function based on solving system of linear equations (2) . The symbols d ktr and d k lin represent, respectively, the corresponding decryption functions, i.e., reversing transposition and using the roots obtained to regain plaintext characters.
In implementing the first stage of the encryption process, e k lin , the matrices (a ij ) and (b i ) are read from a text file and the root set {x * i } was calculated by finding the inverse matrix of equations (2) using the formula
where det(A) denotes the determinant of A and adj(A) is the adjoint matrix.
Input: ciphertext in generated by solving n linear equations Output: ciphertextout Let fp denote file pointer f ile size ← calculate size of ciphertext in if (f ile size) even, then f ile size/2 ← j else add a space char, (f ile size + 1)/2 ← j; 0 ← i; 0 ← k; while (i < f ile size) && !eof(ciphertext lin )) read(a i ) from input file; write(a i ) in output file; inc(k); inc(i); if (a i == EOF ) then break; else move fp to j, read(a j ), write(a j ), inc(j), inc(i), move fp to k; end end In transposing the encryptions generated by solving systems of linear equations, we follow the algorithm shown in Figure 1 . Figures 2 and 3 show an example of the confusion and diffusion effects due to the two encryption operations on part of a plaintext whose ascii-code is: The inverse decryption process proceeds with reversing the transposition process (d ktr (x i )), that is, applying the inverse transposition algorithm of Figure 4 . This operation recovers the ciphertext of roots generated by solving the system of linear equation 2. The roots are then substituted into the linear equations thus recovering the plaintext characters c i . Figure 5 shows the result of the 2 nd stage of decrypting process, i.e., inserting the roots of the ciphertext into the linear equations to get the ascii-code. The resulting real numbers must be rounded to recover the plaintext. 
B. Product cipher with solving non-linear equations
In the following, a 3-stage product cipher resulting from concatenating our encryption function based on solving equation (3) with the Vigenère cipher and with a transposition cipher is constructed. Adding the Vigenère and transposition operations breaks the "monoalphabetic" link between ciphertext and plaintext (the input) by spreading out plaintext redundancy over entire ciphertext.
The triple encryption cryptosystem is a product cipher whose encryption function can be symbolically expressed as follows:
(e ktr • e kvig • e k nlin )(c i ) = e ktr (e kvig (e k nlin (c i ))) = x i (7) where e ktr represents the transposition function, e kvig represents the Vigenère encryption function with k v ig as keyword, e k bis represents the encryption function based on solving equation (3) with k nlin representing the non-linear function f (x), and c i is the i th plaintext character with x i being the corresponding ciphered character. The inverse decryption function follows a reverse order, namely,
where d ktr (x i ) represents the transposition inverse, d kvig (x i ) represents the Vigenère decryption function which recovers the root x * i generated by solving the corresponding non-linear equation with key function k nlin . d k nlin (x i ) represents the decryption function, by which the root x i is substituted into the non-linear equation to recover the plaintext character c i .
We apply the three encryption operations on the same (part of) plaintext with the ascii-code given in the previous section. Figure 7 shows the ciphertext resulting from the first encryption operation (e k nlin ) based on solving the following non-linear equation numerically using the Bisection method: (Figure 7) to an array element in the keyword, y i = x * i + keyword [i] . Depending on the length of the keyword compared to the length of the ciphertext, the same roots will be, with high probability, assigned different encryption values, thus breaking the 1-to-1 correspondence between plaintext letters and ciphertext real roots. Figure 8 depicts the 10 entries of Vigenère's keyword used in encrypting the roots. Figure 9 lists the ciphertext elements generated by applying the Vigenère cipher to the roots using the keyword of Figure 8 . We remark that the 1-to-1 link has been eliminated; equal roots do not anymore correspond to equal ciphertext elements. The third and last encryption operation due to transposition (e ktr ) is applied to the ciphertext of Figure 9 as input using an implementation of the algorithm depicted in Figure 1 . Figure 10 depicts The inverse decryption process proceeds with reversing the transposition process (d ktr (x i ))) applied to the last ciphertext generated by the transposition operation- Figure 10 as input. This operation must result in the ciphertext of Figure 9 , i.e., that generated by applying Vigenère's cipher in the encryption process. To decipher this text we subtract, in order, each real value (y i ) from the corresponding array element of Vigenère's keyword of Figure 8 . In this way the roots arising from the first encryption operation are recovered,
The roots are then substituted in the polynomial function to recover the plaintext characters c i . Following the correlation analysis of data performed in Section IV-A, a similar analysis of the encryption/decryption times versus the size of plaintext of the product cryptosystem combining solving non-linear single equations, Vigenère cipher and transposition operation reveals a linear correlation with coefficients: r enc = 0.9998 and r dec = 0.9988 (See Figure 11) . The linear correlation of the cipher based on solving non-linear equations numerically persists in the product cipher with greater response times. This behavior shows that the encryption/decryption times due to Vigenère encipherment together with the transposition cipher, increase linearly with the size of plaintext.
V. ESTIMATING THE GAINED SECURITY
In this section we use Shannon's probabilistic approach to estimate the security gained by extending our cryptosystems into product ciphers against ciphertext only attacks. We start with a brief introduction to the basic concepts of this approach required to define a security measure.
A cryptosystem is represented as 5-tuple (P, C, K, e K (), d K ()), where P represents the set of possible plaintexts (single letters of the alphabet of the underlying plaintext language), C the set possible ciphertexts, K the set of possible keys, e K () the set of possible encryption functions with K being a random variable which takes values in K according to a (possibly uniform) probability distribution, and d K () represents the corresponding decryption functions.
Shannon [13] defined the entropy function as a measure of uncertainty (in bit length) in the following way. Given a random variable X with probability distribution p(X), the entropy H(X) is:
Here, x i represents all possible values of X and (finite) n being the size of the sample space on which X is defined.
We remark that the maximum value (H(X) = log 2 (n)) is reached in case p(X) is uniform, i.e., p(X = x i ) = 1 n for all i, and the minimum value (H(X) = 0) in case one single X-value is certain, i.e., p(X = x i0 ) = 1 and p(X = x i ) = 0 for all i = i 0 .
Key equivocation will be used as a measure of security; it is a conditional entropy expression of the form H(K|C) and measures the average uncertainty remaining about the key when a ciphertext has been observed. One can show that, following Stinson [16] :
where P n represents the random variable that has as its probability distribution all n-grams of plaintext alphabet, C n is a random variable with a probability distribution being all n-grams of ciphertext symbols and K the random variable with a uniform probability distribution.
In case P represents the alphabet of a natural language (L), one can show that H(P n ) ≈ nH L , where H L represents the entropy of a single letter. For English, H E ≈ 1.25. Also, as the upper bound on entropy H(X) of a random variable X taking l values x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x l with any probability distribution p(X) is log 2 (l), we have H(C n ) ≤ n log 2 (|C|). Putting these results in (10), we get, following Stinson [16] :
In case P does not correspond to a natural language, the language redundancy is zero, e.g., the set of digits, and if |P| = |C| and we assume that the probability distributions of P n and of C n are the same, then H(P n ) − H(C n ) = 0 and, therefore, equation 10 reduces to
Equation (12) tells us that in case the plaintext language has no redundancy, that is, all its symbols are equally probable, there is no information about the key that can be conveyed by the ciphertext n-gram, and, therefore, the uncertainty about the key is entirely determined by the size of the key space. Next we use this result to estimate the security gained by adding Vigenère and transposition encryptions.
A. Product cipher with solving linear equations
As indicated in Section III-A, the size of the space of our cryptosystem based on solving a set of linear equations simultaneously is infinite; there are infinite number of invertible square matrices over R. This makes exhaustive search much harder than the case of Hill cipher defined over a finite field.
As for the additional uncertainty in finding the key added by applying the transposition cipher, we have H(K tr |C n ) = H(K tr ), since the transposition is a mapping from R into R. If block length n is even and we apply the transposition encryption algorithm Figure 1 , the size of key space is
√ πn is the additional key uncertainty gained by applying transposition. For n = 100, the gained uncertainty is ≈ 214.2 bits.
B. Product cipher with solving non-linear equations
The cryptosystem of Section IV-B consists of three encryption stages. We start with the last stage, where transposition encryption is applied on the ciphertext, a string of real numbers, produced from the second stage, the Vigenère encryption. As indicated in the previous section, with n being (even) length of the ciphertext due to Vigenère's encryption. The additional uncertainty in finding the key is:
At the second stage the Vigenère encryption is applied to the ciphertext consisting of the real roots of non-linear equations; it is a mapping from R into R, in which case
Let the length of the keyword-a string of digits, be k. The size of the key space will be |K vig | = 10 k . Therefore, H(K vig ) = log 2 (10 k ) = k log 2 (10)
At the first stage the encryption is monoalphabetic and we discard its contribution to the overall security of the cryptosystem. The key space of the third and the second encryptions is the product of both spaces, and, therefore, the gained uncertainty of the system is the sum H(K tr ) + H(K vig ) ≈ n 2 log 2 ( n 2e ) + log 2 √ πn + k log 2 (10)
For n = 100 and k=20, the gained uncertainty amounts to ≈ 217.5 bits.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We demonstrated that it is possible to build secure symmetric key cryptosystems over the field of real numbers. The starting point was encryption schemes based on rootfinding numerical methods. The designs of these schemes is restricted to substitution, and, therefore, do not satisfy Shannon's principles of secure communication.
We applied Shannon's security principles and extended the proposed schemes into multiple encryption product ciphers. With this extension, the resulting ciphers become similar to contemporary symmetric ciphers such as DES and AES, with the difference that the latter ciphers are defined over finite fields, whereas ours are defined over the field of real numbers. However, implementing the ciphers on a computing machine with finite memory sets upper and lower bounds on the size of the real field; these bounds are determined by the range and the precision of floating point representations of real numbers.
A security measure based on Shannon's entropy function is used to estimate security against ciphertext only attacks gained by adding more encryptions, like Vigenère and transposition operations. As parts of the multi-stage encryption process, these encryptions are mappings from the set of reals R into itself. With such mappings, there is no redundancy in the source (plaintext) language and the probability distributions of source and ciphertext languages are equal. As a result, the uncertainty of finding the corresponding keys depends only on the size of the key space, which, as noted, depends on the range and precision of floating point representations of real numbers. We indicated that arbitrary precision can be achieved using appropriate software libraries and, therefore, the key space size can be made arbitrarily large. This meant that exhaustive search in the key space can be made practically impossible, thus enhancing the security of our product ciphers.
Following the demonstrations presented in this work, future research will concentrate on building secure large scale (industrial) symmetric key cryptosystems defined over the field of real numbers.
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